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Can a Password Stop Police From Searching 
Your Cell Phone Incident to Arrest?* 
by Adam M. Gershowitz 
Associate Professor of Law, 
University of HOllston Law Center 
Over the last decade, cell phone use has exploded. Most 
Americans now use cell phones that contain huge amounts 
of information such as pictures, documents , music, text 
messages, and emails. Not surprisingly, the fact that cell 
phones are carried in public and hold enormous amounts of 
data has made them attractive targets for law enforcement. 
Numerous defendants have been convicted of drug dealing, 
child pornography, and other offenses based on evidence 
found on their cell phones . 
In an earlier article, Adam M. Gershowitz, The iPhone 
Meets the FOllrth Amendment, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 27 
(2008), I explained how, under the "search incident to ar-
rest doctrine," police can conduct warrantless searches of 
ce ll phones when they an-est suspects for practica ll y any 
offense. So long as police have a val id reason to ,lIl'e~ t a 
suspect and fi nd a cell phone on his person or immed iately 
nearby, the search incident to arrest doctrine should per-
mit police to search the arrestee's phone, even if there is 
no reason to believe the phone contains evidence related 
to the anest. The only significant restriction on the search 
of cell phones incident to arrest is that the search must be 
conducted close in time, that is "contemporaneously," with 
the arrest. 
Although it is far from a routine practice , the number of 
cell phone searches incident to arrest has risen dramatically 
recently. Over the last few years, more than fifty cOUl1s 
*Adam M. Gershowitz, PasslVord Protected? Can a Pass-
word Save YOllr Cell Phone from a Search Incident to Ar-
rest?, 96 Iowa L. Rev. 1125 (2011) (reprinted with pernlis-
sion). 
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have been called upon to assess the constitutionality of 
searching cell phones incident to arrest. And the vast ma-
jority of those cOUl1s have approved of the practice. 
With so little judicial protection against warrantless 
cell phone searches, this issue of SEARCH & SEIZURE 
LAW REPORT explores whether individuals can protect 
themselves by password protecting their phones. The value 
of password protecting the phone depends on the answer 
to three crucial questions . First, when police arrest a sus-
pect and encounter a password-protected phone, can they 
attempt to break the password themselves and unlock the 
phone without the consent of the arrestee and without a 
search wanant? Second , how long can police tinker with 
the phone in an effort to gai n access to its contents? And 
thi rd , il' police ca nnot crack the pa~s\I'ord on their 0\\ n, can 
they reques t or even demand tha t tile ,UTestee tU nl over the 
password withollt violnt ing the ,v/imlldo doctrine or the 
Fifth Amendment protection against self incrimination? 
The first question is relatively straightforward to an-
swer. Under case law predating the internet, police are per-
mitted to break into containers to search them incident to 
arrest. Courts have regularly upheld searches where police 
have unlocked or broken into locked glove compartments, 
briefcases, and even locked safes during searches incident 
to arrest. Accordingly, there is a strong argument that, inci-
dent to a lawful an'est, police should be permitted to unlock 
the cell phone so long as they can figure out the password 
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in a short period of time following arrest. This should be 
disconcerting to the millions of Americans who use sim-
plistic passwords (such as "1234" or their birthday) that po-
lice can guess. And it should be worrisome to iPhone users 
whose devices have weak password protection functions 
that are vulnerable to tampering. 
The second question - how long police can take in an 
eff011 to decipher or bypass the password - is more com-
82 
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plicated. In an "ordinary" search incident to arrest, officers 
must conduct the search contemporaneous with arrest. 
Although there is no fIxed time limit, courts require such 
searches to be conducted as soon as 'is pr~cticable and rare-
ly tolerate lengthy drawn-out searches. This limitation is 
deceiving in the context of cell phone searches however. 
Supreme Court precedent provides that when police con-
duct the search of an item associated with the person of an 
arrestee, such as his clothing or wallet, they can take far 
longer to conduct the search and can comfortably do so at 
the stationbouse rather than the scene of the arrest. When 
a cell phone is found in an arrestee's pocket or attached to 
his belt, a compelling argument exists that the phone is as-
sociated with the arrestee's person and that the police can 
take hours to try to break the password, including by using 
computer hacking software at the police station. 
The fInal question - whether police can ask or demand 
that an arrestee reveal or enter his password - also dem-
onstrates how little protection arrestees have in their cell 
phones. In most cases, before requesting a cell phone pass-
word, police should be obligated to read the arrestee his 
Miranda rights. Yet, failure to read the warnings will not 
result in suppression of any illegal evidence found on the 
cell phone because the fmit of the poisonous tree doctrine 
never applies to Miranda violations. 
... Supreme GOUlt precedent 
seemingly gives police authority 
to spend hours trying to crack the 
password at the scene or in the 
comfort of the police station 
If police demanded (rather than requested) that an ar-
restee disclose his password, the arrestee would have only 
a very weak argument that the police have compelled a 
testimonial response in violation of the Fifth Amendment's 
Self Incrimination Clause. Moreover, even if the self-in-
crimination privilege theoretically existed in this context, 
few criminal defendants would be savvy enough to invoke 
the protection. And innocent individuals who have nothing 
illegal on their phones (and thus no evidence to suppress) 
will be unable to bring civil rights lawsuits because recent 
Supreme Court caselaw limits Fifth Amendment remedies 
to "criminal cases," not situations where the police fInd no 
evidence and the individual is allowed to go on his way. 
This issue of SEARCH & SEIZURE LAW REPORT 
paints a grim picture of the privacy of arrestees' cell 
phones. Police have wide authority to search phones inci-
dent to arrest, even if the arrest has nothing to do with the 
phone itself, and even if the phone is password-protected. 
Because cell phones are typically found on an arrestee's 
person, Supreme Court precedent seemingly gives police 
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authority to spend hours trying to crack the password at the 
scene or in the comfort of the police station. And because 
many Americans choose overly simplistic passwords and 
certain cell phones can easily be hacked, there is a chance 
that police can break into the phone without any help from 
the arrestee. If police were to request the password from 
the arrestee, the Miranda doctrine provides only nominal 
protection because defendants rarely invoke it and police 
violation of the rule does not lead to the suppression of evi-
dence. Only if police demand that an arrestee provide his 
password, can he make out a plausible (though still very 
weak) Fifth Amendment claim. 
Supreme Court's "standard" search 
incident to arrest doctrine 
The starting point for today's broad search incident to 
arrest doctrine is the Supreme Court's 1969 decision in 
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Chimel, the 
Court suppressed evidence found when police searched 
Chime!'s entire home, including his attic and garage, fol-
lowing an arrest for burglary. Despite suppressing the evi-
dence, the Chimel decision provided broad authority for 
the police to search incident to arrest. The Court held that 
contemporaneous with a lawful arrest, police could search 
for weapons that an arrestee could use against the officer 
and to prevent an arrestee from concealing or destroying 
evidence. The Court limited the scope of the search to the 
arrestee's person and the area within his immediate con-
trol from which he might gain possession of a weapon or 
destroy evidence. Thus, while police could not rummage 
through Chime],s entire house following arrest, they were 
free to search anywhere on his person or his immediate 
grabbing space. 
A few years after Chillle!, in U.S. 1', Robinson, 414 U.S. 
21 X (1973). the COl1l1 moved a "cr tllrthcr and clarified 
that police could open closed containers when searching 
incident to arrest. Police alTested Robinson for the clime of 
operating a motor vehicle with a revoked license. During a 
search incident to arrest of Robinson's person, the arrest-
ing officer felt an object in Robinson's coat pocket but was 
unsure of what it was. The officer reached into the pocket 
and pulled out a crumpled up cigarette package. Still un-
sure what was in the package, the officer opened it and 
discovered capsules of heroin. Even though Robinson was 
not initially arrested for a drug crime and the officer had 
no reason to believe the package in his pocket .contained 
drugs, the Supreme Court upheld the search. 
The Court announced a bright-line rule for searches inci-
dent to arrest pennitting police officers to open and search 
through all items on an arrestee's person, even if they are 
in a closed container, and even if the officers have no sus-
picion that the contents of the container are illegal. Put dif-
ferently, the Court in Robinson clarified that the search in-
cidentto arrest doctrine is automatic and that COUl1s should 
not conduct case-by-case inquiry to determine whether 
there was any suspicion or whether the search was truly 
© 20 I I Thomson Reuters 
November 2011 Volu~e 38, Number 10 
necessary to protect the officer or prevent the destruction 
of evidence. 
Searching cell phones incid~nt to arrest 
As wireless technology has become ubiquitous, law 
enforcement officers quickly recognized that drug dealers 
could use cell phones to text their drug transactions without 
having to speak on the phone. Accordingly, police began to 
search cell phones incident to arrest and courts were called 
upon beginning in the mid-2000's to assess the constitu-
tionality of such searches. 
Although it is impossible to know how many cell phone 
searches have been conducted incident to arrest over the 
last few years, the number is likely in the thousands. In 
many instances, police likely found nothing incriminating 
and in other cases defendants likely plead guilty without 
challenging the constitutionality of the searches. Neverthe-
less, more than fifty defendants have challenged the war-
rantless search of early generation cell phones over the last 
few years and courts have upheld the searches in the vast 
majority of cases. For instance, in U.s. v. Finley, 477 F.3d 
250, 259-60 (5" Cir. 2007), the court upheld a search of 
text messages because "police officers are not constrained 
to search only for weapons or instruments of escape on the 
arrestee's person; they may also, without any additional 
justification, look for evidence of the arrestee's crime on 
his person in order to preserve it for use at trial." 
Dozens of other courts have reached the sarne conclu-
sion. See, e.g., People v. Diaz, 244 P.2d 501 (Cal. 2011); 
U.S. v. Pineda-Areola, 2010 WL 1490369 (7" Cir. 2010); 
U. s. v. Fuellfes, 2010 WL 724186 (II" Cir. 2010); U.S. v. 
Murphy, 552 FJd 405 (4" Cir. 2009); Silvan Iv. v. Briggs, 
2009 WL 159429 (lO,h Cir. 2009); U. S. v. Faller, 681 F. 
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Supp.2d 1028 (ED. Mo. 2010); Newhard v. Borders, 649 
F. Supp.2d 440 (W.o. Va. 2009); U.S. v. WI,rie, 612 F. 
Supp.2d 104 (D. Mass. 2009); Brady v. Gonzalez, 2009 
WL 1952774 (ND. III. 2009); U.S. v. Quintana, 594 F. 
Supp.2d 1291 (MD. Fla. 2009); U.S. v. McCray, 2009 WL 
29607 (SD. Ga. 2009); U.s. v. Gates, 2008 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
102989 (D. Me. 2008); State v. Harris, 2008 WL 4368209 
(Ariz. App. Div. 1 2008); U.S. v. Santillan, 571 F. Supp.2d 
1093 (D. Ariz. 2008); U.S. v. Deans, 549 F. Supp.2d 1085, 
1094 (D. Minn. 2008); U.S. v. Valdez, 2008 WL 360548 
(ED. Wis. 2008); U. S. v. Cuny, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
5438 (D. Me. 2008); U.S. v. Dennis, 2007 WL 3400500 
(ED. Ky. 2007); U.S. v. Lottie, 2007 WL 4722439 (ND. 
Ind. 2007); U. S. v. Mercado-Nova, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1271 
(D. Kan. 2007); U.S. v. Zamora, 2006 WL 418390 (ND. 
Ga. 2006); U.s. v. Murphy, 2006 WL 3761384 (W.o. Va. 
2006); U.S. v. Diaz, 2006 WL 3193770 (ND. Cal. 2006); 
U.S. v. Cote, 2005 WL 1323343 (ND. Ill. 2006); U.S. v. 
Brookes, 2005 WL 1940124 (D. VI. 2005); U.s. v. Parada, 
289 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (D. Kan. 2003). 
Although the Finley decision has been cited repeatedly 
as the leading case on the search incident to arrest of early 
generation cell phones, a small number of courts have re-
fused to follow its reasoning. For instance, in State v. Smith, 
920 N.E2d 949 (Ohio 2009), the Ohio Supreme Court, in a 
closely divided opinion, refused to accept the crucial prem-
ise that cell phones are just like any other container that 
might hold other objects inside. The majority ruled that 
the search incident to arrest doctrine should not apply to 
cell phones because even basic cell phones "are capable of 
storing a wealth of digitized information Wholly unlike any 
physical object found within a closed container." 
Other courts have rejected the search incident to arrest 
of cel1 phones that OCCUlTed too long after an-est to be con-
temporaneous. See. e.g., U.S. v. Fark, 2007 WL 1521573 
(ND. Cal. 2007); U.S. l'. LaSalle, 2007 WL 1390820 (D. 
Hawaii 2007); COllllllollwealth v. Diaz, 2009 WL 2963693, 
(Mass. Super. Ct. 2009). 
In sum, there are a growing number of instances in 
which police have searched cell phones incident to arrest. 
And while a few courts have rejected such searches on pri-
vacy and contemporaneousness grounds, the ovenvhelm-
ing majority of courts have upheld the searches. Because 
it is unclear whether the Supreme Court will step into this 
area of law and it is unlikely that legislatures will provide 
much statutory protection, it will be· left to cell phone 
users themselves to protect against warrantless searches. 
The most plausible option is for cell phone users to pass-
word protect their phones. 
Police can search locked containers 
incident to arrest 
If a cell phone user has protected her phone with a 
strong password that combines letters, numbers, and sym-
bois, the chances of police randomly guessing the pass-
word should be slim. Yet, password protecting a phone 
84 
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does not cloak it in impenetrable Fourth Amendment 
protection. Password protecting a phoneds equivalent to 
locking a closed container and lower courts have upheld 
. ( the searches of locked containers. , 
... password protecting a phone 
does not cloak it in impenetrable 
Fourth Amendment protection 
Although the search incident to arrest doctrine has ex-
isted for over seventy years, the Supreme Court has never 
clearly stated whether police are permitted to open locked 
containers when searching incident to arrest. Nevertheless, 
the Court's decision in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 
460-61 (1981), which authorized the search of the passen-
ger compartment of a vehicle, broadly stated that police 
could search "any" containers, whether "open or closed." 
And the Belton dissenters clearly expressed their belief that 
the decision extended to locked containers. In the years 
since Beltoll, there has been a fair amount of consensus 
among lower courts permitting police to enter locked con-
tainers as long as they do not irreparably damage them. 
The most common example of police searching a locked 
container is the search of vehicles' glove compartments. 
For nearly three decades, courts have almost unanimous-
ly held that police may open locked glove compartments I 
during searches incident to arrest. See, e.g., U.S. v, Nich-
ols, 512 F.3d 789,797-98 (6ili Cir. 2008); U.s. v. Gonza-
lez, 71 F.3d 819 (llili Cir. 1996); U.S. v. H00dy, 55 F.3d 
1257 (7ili Cir. 1995); U.s. v. McCrady, 774 F,2d 868 (8ili 
Cir. 1985); People \'. P('l'ec.. 214 PJc1 502 (Col. A]1]1. 20(9); 
HIII",,1 v. Stole. Y43 A.2ei 686 I Mel. Spec. App. 20(8); SlllIe 
P. Church, 200S WIA947653 (Del. Super. Ct 2008); Peo-
ple v. Dieppa, 830 N.E.2d 870 (Ill. AppJd 2005); Slale v. 
Brooks, 446 S.E.2d 579 (N.C. 1994); State v. Hanna, 839 
P.2d 450 (Ariz. 1992); State v. Farr, 587 A.2d 1047 (Conn. 
App. 1991); Lewis v. United States, 632 A.2d 383 (D.C. 
App. 1989); Staten v. U.s., 562 A.2d 90 (D.C. App. 1989); 
State v. Gonzalez, 507 So.2d 772 (Fla. Dist. App. 1987); 
State v. F,y, 388 N.E.2d 565 (Wis. 1986); State v. Massen-
burg, 310 S.E.2d 619 (N.Co App. 1984); State v. Reed, 634 
SW.2d 665 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1982); Smith v. U.S., 435 
A.2d 1066 (D.C. 1981) 
Some courts have gone beyond glove compartments 
to permit searches incident to arrest of even more secure 
containers such as locked safes and footlockers. In U.s. v. 
Thomas, 11 F.3d 620, 628 (llili Cir. 1993) the Sixth Circuit 
approved the search incident to arrest of a locked twenty-
pound safe that was contained in a tote bag and found on 
the backseat of a pickup truck. Officers removed the car 
keys from the truck's ignition and found the key to the safe 
on the key ring. The court concluded that searching the safe 
fell squarely within the search incident to arrest doctrine. 
© 201 1 Thomson Reuters 
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Similarly, an Illinois court upheld the search incident to ar-
rest of a locked footlocker on the grounds that it was no 
different than a locked glove compartment. See People v. 
Tripp, 715 N E.2d 689,698 (Ill. App. 1999). 
Courts have likewise permitted police to search locked 
briefcases and overnight bags incident to arrest. One fed-
eral court even upheld the search incident to arrest when 
police pried open the latch of a locked briefcase with a 
screwdriver. See US. v. Howe, 313 F. Supp. 2d. 1178 (D. 
Utah 2003). 
Courts have been less consistent in cases where police 
have tampered with the structural integrity of the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle. As a general rule, courts have 
forbidden police from dismantling the interior of the ve-
hicle when searching incident to arrest. Thus, courts have 
suppressed evidence where police have removed a vehicle 
seat or dismantled the tailgate when searching incident to 
arrest. See DAVID S. RUDSTEIN ET AL., CRlMINAL 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 2.o6[4][bj (2009). Yet, even 
in the face of this logical rule, a number of lower courts 
have given police leeway to conduct searches incident 
to arrest of sealed areas. For example, the Eighth Circuit 
upheld the search incident to arrest of the space between 
the window's rubber seal and the door panel. See US. v. 
Bames, 374 F.3d 601,604 (8- Cir. 2004). 
Although it is difficult to state a rule that explains all 
of the cases, when assessing the search incident to arrest 
of locked or sealed containers three key principles can be 
ascertained. First, courts almost always permit police to 
utilize a key to unlock containers. Second, when no key 
is available, some courts have approved of police physi-
cally breaking locks to enter the container, although the 
COUl1S have offered no detailed analysis justifying their 
decisions. Finally, when dealing with sections of the pas-
senger compartn"lcnt of a vehicle that can easily be disas-
sembled (such as gear shift covers or removable radios), 
courts have seemingly embraced a version of the slogan 
"you break it, you buy it" and upheld the searches as long 
as officers did not damage the vehicle. It is only when 
police have broken items or dismantled major sections of 
the vehicle that courts unequivocally reject the search in-
cident to arrest doctrine. 
Searching a locked (password protected) 
phone is permissible 
Based on this case law, it would seem clear that police 
can attempt to crack a cell phone password during a search 
incident to arrest. Just as police are permitted to try all of 
the keys on the defendant's keychain until locating the one 
that unlocks the glove compartment, police should be able 
to try multiple different combinations in an effort to dis-
cover the password to the phone. 
Of course, there is still a limit on the manner in which 
police can conduct the search incident to arrest. As with 
tangible objects like an automobile, police should be cab-
ined by a rule forbidding them from destroying an object in 
© 20 I I Thomson Reuters 
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order to search it incident to arrest. Many cell phones con-
tain a function that deletes the contents of'the phone if the 
password is incorrectly entered a ,ertain number of times 
in a row. If the phone alerted the offlcer\that another incor-
rect password entry would erase the contents of the phone, 
police should not be permitted to make that final guess. 
Attempts to break passwords must be 
contemporaneous with arrest 
In ascertaining how long police can spend trying to 
crack a password, the best place to begin is the question of 
whether cell phones are items irurnediately associated with 
the arrestee or merely possessions near the arrestee. This 
distinction requires us to parse two Supreme Court cases 
from the 1970s. 
In the somewhat obscure Supreme Court case of US. 
v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974), police arrested Edwards 
at II pm for attempting to break into a government build-
ing. Edwards was promptly brought to jail, processed, and 
placed in a cell. Overnight, police discovered that the per-
petrator had attempted to enter a wooden window and that 
he would likely have paint chips from the window on his 
clothing. The following morning, ten hours after his ar-
rest, police took Edwards' clothing from him to search for 
paint chips. Edwards moved to suppress the evidence on 
the grounds that the search of his clothes occurred too long 
after arrest to fall within the search incident to arrest excep-
tion. The Court rejected Edwards' argument and gave po-
lice wide authority to conduct the search incident to arrest 
well after the arrest was conducted. 
Three years later, in the far more famous Supreme Court 
case of U.S. v. C/wdll'ick, 433 U.S. I (1977), officers aITest-
cd Chadwick as he was trying to load a double-locked foot-
locker into his vehicle. One set of ag('nts hrought Chadwick 
to a federal building and another group of agcllt" followcd 
behind with the footlocker. Approximately ninety minutes 
after the atTest, federal agents opened the footlocker and 
discovered a large quantity of marijuana. 
Unlike in Edwards, the Supreme Court rejected the Gov-
erument's argument that the footlocker could be searched 
incident to arrest. In a brief footnote, the Court distin-
guished Edwards by explaining that "[ujnlike searches of 
the person, searches of possessions within an arrestee's im-
mediate control cannot be justified by any reduced expec-
tations of privacy caused by the arrest." The Court further 
explained that "[0 jnce law enforcement officers have re-
duced luggage or other personal property not immediately 
associated with the person of the arrestee to their exclusive 
control, and there is no longer any danger that the arrestee 
might gain access to the property to seize a weapon or de-
stroy evidence, a search of that property is no longer an 
incident of the arrest." 
The Court's decisions in Edwards and Chadwick thus 
offer two different rules for the temporal scope of searches 
incident to arrest. If the search is of items associated with 
the person, police have great flexibility and can conduct 
85 
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the search many hours after arrest. If, however, the police 
search possessions that are not associated with person and 
are merely nearby, then there is a more rigid time limitation. 
In the three-and-a-half decades since Edwards and Chad-
wick have been decided, the Supreme Court has offered no 
additional guidance. There are, however, a few relatively 
clear principles that can be deciphered from lower court 
decisions. 
Lower courts have repeatedly concluded that, in addi-
tion to clothing, police may also search wallets incident 
to arrest at the stationhouse. See, e.g., U.S. v. Rodriguez, 
995 F.2d 776,778 (7" Cir. 1993). Courts have concluded 
that wallets fall under Edwards because they are typically 
found on the arrestee and are thus much closer to a person's 
clothes than a footlocker. Similarly, courts have upheld sta-
tionhouse searches incident to arrest of purses, dufflebags, 
and backpacks because they appeared to more closely re-
semble items on the person rather than nearby possessions 
like the footlocker in Chadwick. As Professor Wayne La-
Fave has observed in his influential treatise, courts have 
"rather consistently" held that under Edwards police can 
search incident to arrest the "pockets, wallet, [and] other 
containers on the person" at the stationhouse following ar-
rest. See 3 WAYNE LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: 
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 5.3(a} 
at 146-47 (4" ed. 2004). 
When a cell phone is found in an arrestee's pocket, prec-
edent strongly suggests it should be treated like a wallet or 
any other item on the person that is searchable for hours 
after the arrest at the stationhouse under Edwards. A num-
ber of lower courts have reached this conclusion. See U.S. 
v. Fillley, 477 F,3d 250 (5" Cir. 2007); U.s. v. kfurphy, 552 
F,3d 405. 412 (4'" Cir. 2009): u.s. v. H'lIrie, 612 F, Supp. 
2e1 104 (D. Mass. 2009): U.S. v. ClIrry, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS S,BS, at '24-27 (D. Me. 2008): U.S. v. Diaz. 2006 
WL 3193770 (ND. Cal. 2006), at *4; People v. Diaz, 81 
Cal.Rptr.3d 215,217-18 (2008). BUI see U.S. v. Park, 2007 
WL 1521573 (ND. Cal. 2007) (concluding that cell phones 
should fall under Chadwick because they contain an enor-
mous amount of information). 
If cell phones are merely possessions, 
how long can police spend searching 
them before the search ceases to be 
contemporaneous? 
If a court rejects the contention that the phone falls un-
der Edwards and instead finds Chadwick controlling, po-
lice will have far less time to search it incident to arrest. 
Although the Supreme Court has trumpeted the need for 
bright line rules in the search incident to arrest context, the 
Court has refuSed to adopt a bright line rule dictating how 
long police can take to conduct searches under Chadwick. 
Not surprisingly, lower court decisions often appear to be 
completely inconsistent with one another. 
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While courts have refused to draw bright line time limits 
on searches incident to arrest, the contours 'of the caselaw 
does suggest that there is an outer time limit. It is easy to 
locate hundreds of (non-cell phonei cas".s in which courts ( 
permitted searches incident to arrest five, ten, twenty, and 
even sixty minutes, after arrest. See Modern SWillS of 
Rule As To Validity of NOllcollsensllal Search and Seizure 
Made Without Warrant After Lawful Arrest As Affected By 
Lapse of Time Between, or Difference in Places of, Arrest 
alld Search, 19 A.L.R.3d 727 (1968). But very few cases 
involve searches more than an hour after arrest. See, e.g., 
People v. Landry, 80 Cal. Rptr. 880 (Cal. App. 1969) (re-
jecting search occurring one hour and fifteen minutes after 
arrest). The absence of such cases suggests that there truly 
is an implicit outer limit on the time to conduct searches 
incident to arrest. 
Will police have enough time to crack 
the password? 
The key remaining question is whether, practically 
speaking, police will be able to successfully crack a cell 
phone password while complying with the time limits of 
the search incident to arrest doctrine. The answer to this 
question likely turns on where the cell phone is located 
when the owner is arrested. 
If the cell phone is found on an arrestee or in his pocket 
it should be considered part of his person, giving police the 
power to bring it to the station and search it for hours after 
the arrest. If police discover a cell phone within the grab-
bing space of an arrestee, such as in a briefcase or lying on 
the passenger seat of an automobile, they may search it but 
typically must do so at the scene and likely within minutes 
or at most an hour of an-est. Thus, police may have a short 
p,-~riOlI of time to try tu crack the password of a cdl phonl' 
fOllnd [lear an ancstee, and th~y may' have a considerably 
longer period of time to crack the password of a cell phone 
in the pocket of an alTestee. 
If a cell phone must be searched on the scene and police 
have only a few minutes to do so, the password will likely 
prevent the police from accessing the phone's contents. 
While some people use overly simple passwords such as 
"12345" that police can guess, in most cases, police simply 
will not be able to decipher the password during the com-
motion of an arrest. 
In the cases where police bring the cell phone to the sta-
tion house because it is part of the arrestee's person, the 
chances of cracking the password increase dramatically, 
particularly for certain phones. Take the iPhone as an ex-
ample. The iPhone's password function offers three key 
protections: (I) a four digit numerical code; (2) a require-
ment that consecutively entered incorrect passwords dis-
able the phone for a short period before the user can try 
another password, and (3) the option to have the contents 
of the phone deleted if the incorrect password is entered ten 
times. Unfortunately, these protections are extremely weak. 
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A four digit numerical code provides only ten thou-
sand combinations. While this might prevent most human 
guessing, it would not stop a blunt force computer program 
that sequentially inputs every numerical combination. If 
law enforcement utilized a very simple computer program 
to try all ten thousand combinations in a row, they would 
be able to crack the password in minutes. Wbile police sta-
tions likely do not currently have such programs at their 
fingertips, it is quite possible they will in the near future as 
technology becomes more ubiquitous. 
Moreover, even if police never set up the program to 
crack a password, they may be able to bypass the pass-
word altogether by hacking into the phone. Numerous 
internet videos that show users how to access the data on 
the iPhone. For some older versions of the phone, police 
only need to tinker with the device itself to bypass the 
password function altogether in a matter of moments. In 
the comfort of the police station, police could therefore 
gain access to the data on a passlVord protected cell phone 
in a matter of minutes. 
The iPhone meets Fifth Amendment 
As detailed above, the search incident to arrest doctrine 
provides police with the opportunity to guess or crack a cell 
phone's password in an effort to search it. Wbat happens, 
however, if police are unable to break into the phone on 
their own? Can police ask or even demand that an arrestee 
enter the password himself or verbally provide the pass-
word to the police? 
As explained below, while the law is complicated, 
in many cases police will be able to obtain the password 
without mnning afoul of the Fifth Amendment. If police 
request the password from an anestee who is in custody, 
they have likely engaged in intelTogation that requires ;Hi-
randa warnings. Yet, hecause the fruit of the poisonous tree 
doctrine does not apply to evidence discovered as a result 
of klironda violations, police can fail to comply with AIi~ 
ronda and suffer no consequences. 
If anestees tum over their password in response to a 
police demand (as opposed to a voluntary request), the ar-
restee can make only a very weak argument that the police 
have violated the Fifth Amendment by compelling incrimi-
nating information. Moreover, many arrestees will never 
reach this point because they will consensually relinquish 
their passlVord well in advance of a police demand. 
Miranda doctrine may protect against 
requests for passwords, but violations 
will not lead to suppression of 
valuable evidence 
For the Miranda doctrine to apply, an individual must 
be in custody and subject to interrogation. The interroga-
tion element is easily satisfied. When a police officer asks 
an individual "What is your password? ," that inquiry is a 
question that constitutes interrogation. Moreover, even if 
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the officer is clever enough to avoid phrasing the matter as 
a question (for instance, "please tell me the'password") the 
Supreme Court has recognized that such functional equiva-
lents of questioning amount to i1iterrogation if they are 
designed to elicit an incriminating response. Accordingly, 
requesting that an arrestee voluntarily tum over the pass-
word to his phone (which may inculpate him by leading to 
evidence on the phone) amounts to interrogation. 
The custody question is also fairly simple. Although the 
Supreme Court has adopted different tests for determining 
whether a person is under arrest and whether they are in 
custody for Miranda purposes, it seems clear that an in-
dividual who has been formally subjected to a full-scale 
custodial arrest is in custody for Miranda purposes. Thus, if 
an officer requests the password to a phone during a search 
incident to arrest, the arrestee is also in custody for Mi-
randa purposes. 
Yet, as in many other instances, the Miranda require-
ment is a hollow protection, because the fmit of the poison-
ous tree doctrine does not apply to Miranda violations. See 
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). While a confession 
that violates Miranda wiII be suppressed, evidence found 
thereafter will be admissible. Thus, if police obtain an ar-
restee's password in violation of Miranda, the statement 
conceding knowledge of the password will be inadmissi-
ble, but the valuable resulting evidence - the incriminating 
text messages or child pornography found on the phone -
will be admissible. 
Police demands for password likely 
do not amount to violation of Fifth 
Amendment's self-incrimination clause 
A final problem w0I1hy of attention is what happens if 
police dern:lIld (rathl'r than rl'LJlll'st) that the arrl~stee pm~ 
viele his password and the arrestee cOlllplies out of a belief 
that he has no choice. In this scenario, have police COJll-
pelled an ,UTestee to incriminate himself with a testimonial 
response in violation of the Fifth Amendment's protection 
against Self-Incrimination? Although the law is murky, the 
answer is probably "no." 
In order to assert a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination 
challenge, an individual must demonstrate three things: (I) 
that he has been compelled; (2) to produce testimony; (3) 
that is incriminating. Taking the elements out of order, it is 
simple to satisfy the incrimination requirement. Although 
a password will almost never be incriminating by itself, 
the information it protects often will be. For over half-a-
century, the Supreme Court has recognized that the Fifth 
Amendment protection applies not only to responses that 
are themselves incriminating but also to information that 
"would furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to 
prosecute the claimant." Hoffman v. U.S., 341 U.S. 479, 
486 (1951). Thus, if providing the password leads to in-
criminating information, the element is satisfied. 
It is also fairly easy to satisfy the "testimonial element. 
Evidence is testimonial (and thus protected by the Fifth 
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Amendment) if it causes a person "to reveal, directly or in-
directly, his knowledge of facts relating him to the offense 
or from having to share his thoughts and beliefs with the 
Government." Doe v. U.S., 487 U.S. 201, 213 (1988). The 
Court has recognized that most verbal statements "convey 
information or assert facts" and therefore "[tlhe vast major-
ity of verbal statements thus will be testimonial." 
While the incriminating and testimonial elements are 
satisfied, it is much more challenging for a defendant to 
demonstrate the compulsion element. Ordinarily, when one 
thinks of a person being compelled to incriminate herself, 
it is not via police interrogation but instead in the context 
of a grand jury subpoena. Indeed, when police officers in-
terrogate a suspect they lack the legal authority to compel 
the individual to say anything. As a result, it is not surpris-
ing that the only two cases in which defendants have been 
compelled to disclose their computer passwords have been 
in response to grand jury subpoenas. See U.S. v. Kirschner, 
2010 WL 1257355 (ED. Mich. 2010); In re Boucher, 2009 
WL424718 (D. Vt. 2009). 
The idea that police cannot compel incriminating testi-
mony is further supported by the Supreme Court's plural-
ity decision in Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760 (2003). 
In Chavez, a plurality of the Court concluded that an indi-
vidual who had been inappropriately interrogated could not 
raise a self-incrimination claim in a civil rights lawsuit be-
cause no criminal charges had ever been filed against him 
and therefore he had not been forced to incriminate himself 
in a criminal case in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Put 
differently, while police might have compelled informa-
tion from Chavez, they did not do so for Fifth Amendment 
purposes because the protection against self-incrimination 
applies only to testimony used in criminal cases. 
rU!1hcr supporting the position that police cannot com-
pc-J testimony is the fact that for the last century, cases al-
leging police misconduct during interrogations have almost 
universally been analyzed under the klirnnda doctrine or 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's due process 
clauses, not the Self-Incrimination Clause. 
In sum, a police demand for an arrestee's password can 
certainly be testimonial and incriminating, but the self-in-
crimination claim should probably fail because the defen-
dant is unable to demonstrate compUlsion. Accordingly, 
an arrestee who turned over his password in response to 
police demands has, at best, a very weak argument that his 
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination 
has been violated. 
Moreover, even if the self-incrimination claim were vi-
able, most arrestees will never be in a position to assert it 
because they will have revealed the password voluntarily. 
If police simply ask, rather than demand, that an arrestee 
consensually enter the password to his phone, there will 
have been no compulsion and hence no Fifth Amendment 
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violation. At bottom, arrestees likely have little or no self-
incrimination protection against police demands for cell 
phone passwords. 
Conclusion 
Password protecting your cell phone is undoubtedly a 
good idea. If the phone is lost, the password will help to 
protect the data. And if you are arrested, the password will 
make it more difficult for police officers to search the phone 
incident to arrest. But password protecting the phone will 
not necessarily prevent the police from bypassing the pass-
word and conducting a warrantless search of the phone. 
As a legal matter, password protecting the phone pro-
vides virtually no additional protection against police 
searching a cell phone incident to arrest. Longstanding 
case law permits police to attempt to open locked contain-
ers when searching incident to arrest. Because cell phones 
are often found on the person of an arrestee, police can 
bring them to the station where computer savvy officers 
can spend hours attempting to hack into the phone without 
first procuring a warrant. 
... password protecting the 
phone provides virtually no 
additional protection against 
police searching a cell phone 
incident to arrest 
Moreover, even if police cannot decipher the password 
011 {heir own, they stanJ a strong chance uf acquiring tht: 
password from simple police interrogation. Requesting 
the password would require police to give J\1iranda warn-
ings, yet most individuals waive their iV/iranda rights 
and, in any event, violations of Miranda do not lead to 
suppression of evidence found subsequently. Arrestees 
would likewise have little chance of successfully assert-
ing a Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim because 
police are not judicial officers and lack the authority to 
"compel" incriminating information in violation of the 
Self-Incrimination Clause. 
In sum, police have wide authority to search the con-
tents of cell phones - including text messages, voicemails, 
photos, internet browsing history, and reams of other data 
- when searching an arrestee incident to arrest. Given that 
password protecting the phone does little to curb police 
power, the Supreme Court and legislatures should under-
take efforts to scale back police power to search digital de-
vices incident to arrest. 
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